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Highlights 
 
 A macrodynamic model with Minskyan insights is presented. 
 Firms’ and banks’ desired margins of safety change endogenously. 
 A higher sensitivity of the desired margins of safety to the investment cycle is 
conducive to instability. 
 The relationship between investment and leverage cycles is explored.  
 The stabilising role of fiscal policy is emphasised.   
 
*Highlights (for review)
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Margins of safety and instability 
in a macrodynamic model with Minskyan insights 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper develops a stock-flow consistent macrodynamic model in which firms’ and 
banks’ desired margins of safety play a central role in macroeconomic performance. 
The model incorporates an active banking sector and pays particular attention to the 
leverage of both firms and banks. It is shown that the endogenous change in the 
desired margins of safety of firms and banks is likely to transform an otherwise stable 
debt-burdened economy into an unstable one. The endogeneity of the desired margins 
of safety can also produce, under certain conditions, investment and leverage cycles 
during which investment and leverage move both in the same and in the opposite 
direction. Furthermore, the paper investigates the potential stabilising role of fiscal 
policy. It is indicated that fiscal policy can reduce the destabilising forces in the 
macroeconomy when government expenditures adjust adequately to variations in the 
divergence between the actual and the desired margins of safety.   
 
Keywords: Margins of safety; instability; leverage ratios; Minskyan macroeconomic 
analysis 
 
JEL Classifications: E12; E32; E44; E62 
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Margins of safety and instability 
in a macrodynamic model with Minskyan insights 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The financial crisis that hit the world economy in 2007-8 has brought to the fore the 
crucial role of economic agents’ desired margins of safety in the emergence of 
financial fragility and macroeconomic instability. The prolonged period of stable and 
high growth witnessed by many developed countries during the last decades, in 
conjunction with the absence of important financial episodes, boosted the euphoria of 
economic agents inducing them to accept lower margins of safety. This provided the 
ground for increasing financial fragility, which was not confined to the production 
sector, but was also remarkably associated with the banking sector. The growing 
financial fragility rendered the macro systems prone to instability and crisis. 
 
The financial crisis has also put at the centre of the stage the potential stabilising role 
of fiscal policy. Scholars who draw on Minsky’s macroeconomic analysis have 
pointed out that fiscal policy is a major vehicle for ensuring the stability of the 
macroeconomic system when private consumption and investment are weak (see e.g. 
Papadimitriou and Wray, 1998; Tymoigne, 2009). It has been argued that government 
expenditures can place a floor to incomes and economic activity, reducing the 
possibility of financial breakdown. Although expansionary fiscal policy was initially 
used by many governments as a response to the crisis (see Arestis and Sawyer, 2010), 
concerns about fiscal deficits and rising public indebtedness quickly produced a 
change in attitude toward the implementation of austerity measures.  
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The purpose of this paper is to formalise some theoretical aspects of the above-
mentioned developments and considerations within a macrodynamic model with 
Minskyan insights. The paper draws on the extensive literature that has modelled 
various dimensions of Minsky’s (1975, 1982, 2008) macroeconomic analysis.1 The 
contribution of the paper, compared to this literature, lies on the explicit examination 
of the following two issues within a stock-flow consistent framework.
2
 
 
First, the constructed model allows the desired margins of safety of firms and banks to 
change endogenously during the investment cycle. Although the role of economic 
agents’ desired margins of safety is critical to Minsky’s analysis for the emergence of 
financial fragility and instability,
3
 the formal literature has so far paid little attention to 
the distinction between the actual and the desired margins of safety.
4
 Most 
importantly, this literature has not sufficiently analysed the endogenous character of 
these margins of safety and the exact mechanisms through which the change in the 
desired margins of safety is conducive to macroeconomic instability.
5
 The current 
paper shows both analytically and via simulations the destabilising role of endogenous 
movements in the desired margins of safety. In our framework the margins of safety of 
firms and banks are captured by their leverage ratios.
6
 
                                                 
1
 See e.g. Ryoo (2010) and the references therein. 
2
 For the stock-flow consistent approach to macro modelling see Godley and Lavoie (2007). 
3
 See e.g. Kregel (1997), Tymoigne (2009) and Vercelli (2011).  
4
 For some exceptions see Dafermos (2012), Le Heron (2008, 2011, 2012, 2013) and Le Heron and 
Mouakil (2008).  
5
 Some recent attempts to endogenise the desired margins of safety can be found in Le Heron (2011, 
2013) where the conventional leverage ratio is a function of the state of confidence or the growth rate. 
Ryoo (2010) has investigated some macro effects of the endogenous change in the desired margins of 
safety. However, in his model the desired margins of safety are basically driven by households’ 
behaviour in the stock market and not by the endogenous changes in the euphoria of firms and banks 
during the investment cycle, as is the case in this paper. 
6
 As Minsky (2008, p. 266) points out, ‘increased leverage by banks and ordinary firms decreases the 
margins of safety’.  
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The analysis of this paper focuses on the case of a debt-burdened regime. In our debt-
burdened regime the capacity utilisation and the investment rate are both negatively 
affected by the leverage of firms.
7
 Nishi (2012) argues that in the Minskyan analytical 
framework the debt-burdened regime corresponds to the downturn phases, when the 
leverage ratio affects negatively investment, while the debt-led regime is consistent 
with the boom phase, in which leverage and capital accumulation both increase. This 
paper indicates that the incorporation of endogenous desired margins of safety in an 
economy characterised by a debt-burdened regime can produce cycles during which 
investment and leverage move both in the same and in the opposite direction. This 
implies that the Minskyan boom and downturn phases can be reproduced without 
being necessary to switch from a debt-burdened to a debt-led regime. Furthermore, the 
paper shows that the endogeneity of the desired margins of safety can generate 
instability in an otherwise stable debt-burdened economy.  
 
Second, the model of this paper examines the extent to which fiscal policy is capable 
of preventing in a debt-burdened economy the instability that stems from the 
endogenous changes in firms’ and banks’ desired margins of safety. In particular, it 
sets forth a fiscal rule according to which the government expenditures increase 
(decrease) when the desired margins of safety tend to rise (fall) relative to the actual 
ones. Numerical simulations show that this rule has a stabilising role which is broadly 
in line with Minsky’s arguments about the capacity of the government to reduce 
destabilising forces in the macro system. Although the stabilising effects of fiscal 
policy have been examined within similar frameworks (see e.g. Charpe et al., 2011, 
                                                 
7
 For the distinction between the debt-burdened and debt-led regimes see Hein (2013), Nishi (2012) and 
Sasaki and Fujita (2012). 
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ch. 9; Keen, 1995; Yoshida and Asada, 2007), our model provides a new perspective 
on this issue by linking fiscal policy with the desired margins of safety and the 
leverage of firms and banks. 
 
Importantly, the above-mentioned issues are examined within a framework that 
incorporates an active banking sector. Following various recent contributions in macro 
modelling (see e.g. Charpe and Flaschel, 2013; Dafermos, 2012; Le Heron, 2008, 
2011, 2012, 2013; Le Heron and Mouakil, 2008; Ryoo, 2013b), it is assumed that 
banks impose credit rationing when they provide loans to firms. In our setup, the 
degree of credit rationing depends upon the financial position of both firms and banks.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out the structure of the model. 
Section 3 presents the main properties, the dynamic equations and the steady state of 
the macro system. Section 4 explores analytically and via simulations the destabilising 
effects of the endogenous changes in the desired margins of safety of firms and banks. 
It also illustrates how fiscal policy can stabilise an otherwise unstable debt-burdened 
economy. Section 5 summarises and concludes. 
 
2. Structure of the model 
 
The economy of the model is composed of households, firms, banks, the central bank 
and the government. Table 1 displays the balance sheet matrix. Table 2 depicts the 
transactions matrix. Households receive wage income, interest income and the 
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distributed profits of firms and banks.
8
 They keep their wealth only in the form of 
bank deposits. They do not take out loans from banks. Firms finance their investment 
expenditures using loans and retained profits. Banks provide loans to firms, hold 
treasury bills and high-powered money; their liabilities comprise household deposits 
and advances from the central bank. Banks’ undistributed profits are used to build 
capital. Central bank holds treasury bills and advances on the asset side of its balance 
sheet and high-powered money on the liability side. Its profits are distributed to the 
government. Government issues treasury bills to finance its expenditures.
9
 Inflation is 
assumed away and the level of prices is set, for simplicity, equal to unity. There is 
only one type of product which can be used for both consumption and investment 
purposes. 
 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
 
Eq. (1) gives the disposable income of households  dY : 
 
dddd PBPFDiWY   (1) 
 
where W  is the wage bill, di  is the interest rate on deposits, D  is the amount of 
deposits, dPF  denotes the distributed profits of firms and dPB  denotes the distributed 
profits of banks. 
                                                 
8
 Households are the owners of firms and banks. To avoid complications, it is assumed that firms and 
banks do not issue shares.   
9
 For simplicity, there are no taxes in the model. Thus, fiscal policy is implemented via changes only in 
the government expenditures. 
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The wage bill of households is written as: 
 
YsW w  (2) 
 
where ws  is the income share of wages and Y  is the level of output.  
 
Households’ consumption  C  depends on their disposable income and deposits: 
 
DcYcC d 21   (3) 
 
where 10 12  cc . 
 
The change in deposits is determined by the following equation: 
 
CYD d 
  (4) 
 
Eq. (5) shows the profits of firms  PF : 
 
LiWYPF l  (5) 
 
where li  is the lending interest rate and L  is the amount of firms’ loans. 
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The undistributed profits of firms  uPF  are determined as a proportion  fs  of their 
total profits: 
 
PFsPF fu   (6) 
 
Eq. (7) gives the distributed profits of firms  dPF : 
 
ud PFPFPF   (7) 
 
In the formulation of investment expenditures, the distinction between the desired 
investment of firms  dI  and the effective one  I  is adopted (Dafermos, 2012; Le 
Heron and Mouakil, 2008). The effective investment is equal to the desired one minus 
the amount of new loans that are credit rationed by banks  crNL . In particular, it holds 
that: 
 
crd NLII   (8) 
 
From Eq. (8) it is straightforward that credit rationing exerts a negative impact on 
effective investment. The desired investment scaled by capital stock  dg  is given by: 
 
 T
d
d lflfu
K
I
g  210   (9) 
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where 0,, 210  , K  is the capital stock, 0  denotes the ‘animal spirits’ of 
entrepreneurs and u  is the rate of capacity utilisation. The utilisation rate is written as 
)( KvYu  , where v  is the exogenously given full-capacity output-to-capital ratio. 
Eq. (9) shows that the desired investment rate is affected by endogenous changes in 
capacity utilisation and in the leverage ratio relative to the target one.
10
 It is postulated 
that the leverage ratio (i.e. the loans to capital ratio, KLlf  ) is used by firms as a 
proxy for their actual margins of safety: a high (low) leverage ratio implies low (high) 
margins of safety. The desired margins of safety are reflected in the value of firms’ 
target leverage ratio  Tlf . Eq. (9) suggests that the lower the actual leverage ratio 
relative to the target one, the higher the investment rate (and vice versa).
11
 This 
formulation is broadly in line with Minsky’s (2008) emphasis on the role of leverage 
and desired margins of safety in the capital accumulation process (see, e.g., Minsky, 
2008, p. 209). 
 
It is important to point out that our formulation does not imply that a rise in the target 
leverage ratio of firms always leads to a higher actual leverage ratio. The induced 
increase in desired investment, which tends to make lf  higher, might be 
overcompensated by the increase in undistributed profits (due to higher economic 
activity) and the rise in capital stock (due to higher investment), both of which tend to 
reduce lf . If this happens, a ‘paradox of debt’ occurs: although firms try to increase 
their leverage ratio by increasing investment they end up with a lower leverage ratio.
12
 
                                                 
10
 Obviously, capital accumulation may also rely on other variables, such as the rate of profit, the 
interest rate or the Tobin’s q. In this paper, we use a simple specification to focus on the effects of 
firms’ margins of safety. 
11
 For some similar formulations that capture the impact of desired and actual margins of safety on 
investment see Dafermos (2012) and Le Heron (2008, 2011, 2013). 
12
 For a detailed discussion of the ‘paradox of debt’ in formal models see Hein (2007, 2013), Lavoie 
(1995) and Ryoo (2013a). 
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Interestingly, the overall result on lf  is also affected by the credit rationing behaviour 
of banks. 
 
The change in loans  L  is given by the following formula: 
 
repLNLNLL crd   (10) 
 
where dNL  stands for the demanded amount of new loans and rep  for the loan 
repayment ratio. Since the amount of credit rationed loans are always a fraction of 
demanded loans it invariably holds that dcr NLNL  . 
 
The demanded amount of new loans are determined as follows: 
 
repLPFINL u
dd   (11) 
 
The amount of new loans that are credit rationed, scaled by capital stock, are given by 
the following formula: 
 
 T
cr
lblbblfbb
K
NL
 210  (12) 
 
where 0,, 210 bbb . The term 0b  captures exogenous factors that affect credit 
rationing (such as the ‘animal spirits’ of banks, the degree of securitisation etc.). The 
second term illustrates that a higher leverage of firms reduces the willingness of banks 
to provide credit: when the leverage of firms increases banks conceive the risk of 
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borrowers’ default to increase.13 Eq. (12) also suggests that the bank leverage plays a 
crucial role in the determination of credit availability. The leverage of banks  lb  is 
given by their assets-to-capital ratio: 
 
adhpmblf
hpmblf
lb
b
b


  (13) 
 
where KBb bb   is the banks’ treasury bills  bB -to-capital ratio, KHPMhpm   is 
the high-powered money  HPM -to-capital ratio, KDd   is the deposits-to-capital 
ratio and KAa   is the advances  A -to-capital ratio. Note that according to the 
balance sheet matrix (see Table 1) the bank capital  bK  is equal to 
ADHPMBL b  . Minsky (2008, ch. 10) emphasises the importance of banks’ 
leverage in the processes that lead the macroeconomy toward higher financial fragility. 
In Minsky’s analysis, the inducement of banks to increase their leverage as a means to 
heighten the return on equity is one of the principal factors that increase the supply of 
financing by banks. In our framework, a higher bank leverage increases, ceteris 
paribus, banks’ concerns about their own financial position. Thus, credit rationing is 
positively affected by bank leverage. However, any rise in the target bank leverage 
ratio  Tlb , which as will be shown below changes endogenously during the 
investment cycle, decreases credit rationing. This implies that, in broad line with 
Minsky’s arguments, any inducement of banks to accept higher leverage ratios pushes 
up the accumulation of firm debt.
14
  
                                                 
13
 See Le Heron and Mouakil (2008) for a similar assumption. 
14
 Charpe and Flaschel (2013) use a similar formulation in which credit rationing is connected with 
banks’ net wealth. Ryoo (2013b), who also relies on Minsky’s framework, postulates a positive effect of 
bank leverage on credit availability. 
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Eqs. (8)-(12) suggest that the undistributed profits of firms have both first-round and 
second-round effects on the leverage of firms. The first-round effects stem from the 
fact that higher retained profits reduce, ceteris paribus, firms’ demand for new loans 
driving down their leverage. This fall in leverage produces, however, some second-
round feedback effects because it boosts the desired investment of firms and decreases 
credit rationing. These second-round effects tend to increase both the numerator and 
the denominator in the leverage ratio with the overall result being ambiguous.  
 
Banks’ profits  PB  are given by: 
 
AiDiBiLiPB adbbl   (14) 
 
where bi  is the interest rate on treasury bills and ai  is the interest rate on advances; ai  
is determined by the central bank. For simplicity, it is assumed that ab ii  .  
 
Banks retain a proportion  bs  of their profits: 
 
PBsPB bu   (15) 
 
The distributed profits of banks  dPB  are equal to: 
 
ud PBPBPB   (16) 
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The interest rates on deposits and loans are determined as follows: 
 
add ihi   (17) 
 
all ihi   (18) 
 
where 1dh  is the mark-down and 1lh  is the mark-up over the interest rate on 
advances. Note that dh  and lh  are exogenously given in our analysis. 
 
Banks hold reserves, which are a fixed proportion  1h  of deposits: 
 
DhHPM 1  (19) 
 
Banks also hold treasury bills as a fixed proportion  2h  of deposits: 
 
DhBb 2  (20) 
 
The advances act as a residual in the balance sheet of banks :
15
 
 
ub PBDLBMPHA 
  (21) 
 
The change in government’s treasury bills  B  is determined by its budget constraint: 
 
                                                 
15
 Note that 
ub PBK 
 . 
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PCBBiGOVB b 
  (22) 
 
where PCB  denotes the profits of the central bank (recall that these profits are 
distributed to the government) and govKGOV   denotes the government 
expenditures. 
 
The profits of the central bank are equal to the sum of the interest on treasury bills 
 cbB  and the interest on advances: 
 
AiBiPCB acbb   (23) 
 
The treasury bills held by the central bank are given by Eq. (24): 
 
AHPMBcb   (24) 
 
Eq. (25) gives the output of the economy: 
 
GOVICY   (25) 
 
Note that the redundant equation of the model is: 
 
bredcb BBB   (26) 
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This equation should be verified in our simulations so as to ensure that the model is 
stock-flow consistent.  
 
Having presented the main structure of the model, we are now in a position to describe 
the law of motion of the target leverage ratios (desired margins of safety) of firms and 
banks. As shown above, the target leverage ratios play a central role in the behaviour 
of the macroeconomy since they influence the investment and lending decisions. 
 
The law of motion of firms’ target leverage ratio is captured by the following formula: 
 
   TTnT lflfggfl  021   (27) 
 
where 0, 21  . Eq. (27) suggests that the change in the target leverage ratio of firms 
relies on the difference between the effective investment rate  KIg   and what is 
conceived as a normal rate of investment  ng , which is used as a reference point. 
When the rate of effective investment in the economy is higher than ng , there is a rise 
in the euphoric expectations of firms, since the economy appears to perform much 
better than what is normally expected. With everything else given, this leads firms to 
relax their desired margins of safety or, equivalently stated, to increase their target 
leverage ratio: what before was conceived as a risky project may now be evaluated as 
a safe investment due to the general good performance of the economy. The parameter 
1  reflects the sensitivity of firms’ target leverage ratio to differences between the 
effective and the normal investment rate. The higher this parameter the more prone the 
expectations of firms to the investment cycle.  
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The second term in Eq. (27) implies that firms do not allow their target leverage ratio 
to deviate significantly from a reference value  Tlf 0 . When the target leverage ratio 
increases (decreases) relative to the reference value, firms are prompted to reduce 
(increase) their target leverage ratio. 
 
Minsky (2008, p. 255) points out that in an environment of favourable expectations, 
the higher willingness of firms to invest is accompanied by a higher willingness of 
bankers to finance investment projects: ‘[b]ecause bankers live in the same 
expectational climate as businessmen, profit-seeking bankers will find ways of 
accommodating their customers; this behavior by bankers reinforces the 
disequilibrating pressures’. In order to capture this Minskyan idea we allow the target 
leverage ratio of banks to co-move with the target leverage ratio of firms: 
 
TT lflb   (28) 
 
where   is a positive parameter. Eqs. (27)-(28) imply that both firms’ and banks’ 
desired margins of safety change during the investment cycle. When, for instance, the 
effective investment rate is higher than the normal one, not only firms increase their 
target leverage ratio, placing upward pressures on investment, but also banks become 
more willing to target a higher leverage ratio and increase thereby credit availability. 
The reason is that the expansionary environment improves the repayment history of 
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borrowers and, hence, banks become less concerned about the repercussions of an 
increase in their own leverage ratios.
16
 
 
Overall, Eqs. (27) and (28) are consistent with Minsky’s (2008, p. 209) argument that 
‘[a] history of success will tend to diminish the margin of safety that business and 
bankers require…a history of failure will do the opposite’. It will be shown below that 
this endogenous change in the desired margins of safety of both firms and banks is 
likely to transform an otherwise stable debt-burdened economy into an unstable one. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the additional purposes of this paper is to 
examine whether fiscal policy can play a stabilising role in our macrodynamic system.  
In an economy in which the desired margins of safety change endogenously, this 
stabilising role could be attained if the government expenditures adjust adequately to 
variations in the divergence between the actual and the desired margins of safety. The 
fiscal rule described in Eq. (29) captures this idea:  
 
           govgovelblblblbelflflflfevog rToTToT  30201  (29) 
 
Note that 0,, 321 eee . Eq. (29) states that, other things equal, the government 
expenditures-to-capital ratio increases (decreases) when the difference between the 
actual and the target leverage ratio of firms and banks becomes higher (lower) than 
their difference in the steady state. The economic intuition of this rule is the following: 
when the actual leverage ratios are much higher than the target leverage ratios there is 
                                                 
16
 For the endogenous change in the desired margins of safety of banks during the economic cycle see 
also Kregel (1997) and Tymoigne (2009). Moreover, for macro models in which the endogenous 
changes in the lender’s risk play a crucial role in the credit rationing procedure see Le Heron (2011, 
2013). 
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a tendency for investment to decrease since firms and banks are less willing to 
participate in new debt contracts; this produces contractionary forces in the economy. 
By increasing its expenditures the government can counteract theses forces, stabilising 
economic activity and thereby the leverage ratios. The same stabilising role can be 
played when government expenditures are driven down in response to a decline in the 
difference between the actual and the target leverage ratios. 
 
The third term in Eq. (29) has been introduced to capture the fact that the government 
attempts to avoid excessive expenditures; rgov  is a reference value. When 
rgovgov  , the government expenditures-to-capital ratio tends to decrease, and vice 
versa (see Charpe et al. 2011, ch. 9 for a similar assumption).  
 
3. The 5D macroeconomic system 
 
The equilibrium in the product market is brought about by changes in the rate of 
capacity utilisation.
17
 We insert Eqs. (3) and (8) into (25) and divide through by capital 
stock. Making the necessary substitutions and solving for the equilibrium rate of 
capacity utilisation  *u  we obtain: 
 
     



lbbaclfbcdccgovlfbb
u
T
23112212112200*   (30) 
 
                                                 
17
 In the current paper the rate of capacity utilisation is endogenously determined both in the short run 
and the long run. For the debate over the long-run endogeneity of capacity utilisation see Hein et al. 
(2012) and Skott (2012).  
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where     011 21  dbabd ishisi ,     lflb isis  112 ,   013  ab is  and 
   11 11  wf ssvcv . The product market equilibrium requires that the 
denominator of (30) be positive (i.e. 0 ). We also assume that the numerator in Eq. 
(30) is positive to obtain a positive *u . 
 
Substituting Eq. (30) into Eq. (8) we get the equilibrium rate of effective investment 
 *g : 
 
    lbblfbulfbbg T 212
*
12200
*    (31) 
 
Differentiating Eqs. (30) and (31) with respect to lf , d , a , Tlf  and gov  yields:
 18
 
 



lf
lf
lbbbc
ulfu
21221**

 (32) 


 dd
lbbcc
udu 2211**  (33) 
0231** 


 aa
lbbc
uau  (34) 
022** 



 b
ulfu Tlf
T  (35) 
0
1** 

 govugovu  (36) 
lflflf lbbbuglfg 212
*
1
**    (37) 
ddd lbbugdg 2
*
1
**    (38) 
02
*
1
**  aaa lbbugag   (39) 
                                                 
18
 It can be easily shown that the economic activity in the model is wage-led (i.e. 0*  Wsu ).  
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0*122
**  TT lflf
T ubglfg   (40) 
0*1
**  govgov uggovg   (41) 
 
where
19
 
 
  
0
2
21
2 



dhhlf
da
lblblflb lf  (42) 
 
  221
212
dhhlf
ahhlf
lblbdlb d


  (43) 
 
0
21
2



dhhlf
lb
lbalb a  (44) 
 
The impact of firms’ leverage on capacity utilisation and effective investment cannot 
be unambiguously determined (see Eqs. (32) and (37)). In the model there are three 
unfavourable and two favourable effects of a higher firms’ leverage on economic 
activity (see Table 3). An increase in the leverage of firms tends to depress investment 
due to the direct adverse impact on desired investment and credit rationing. Moreover, 
it places downward pressures on consumption because it affects negatively firms’ 
distributed profits. These are the unfavourable effects. The favourable effects are 
associated with the expansionary impact of banks’ distributed profits on consumption 
as well as with the inverse link between the leverage of firms and the leverage of 
banks (see Eq. (42)); the latter implies that, other things equal, when the firm leverage 
increases (decreases) the bank leverage falls (rises), increasing (reducing) thereby 
credit availability. 
                                                 
19
 Scaling Eqs. (19) and (20) by capital stock and substituting into (13), yields: 
     adhhlfdhhlflb  2121 1 . 
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<Insert Table 3 here> 
 
As mentioned at the outset, this paper focuses on the case of a debt-burdened regime 
in which, according to the definition adopted, the partial derivatives of capacity 
utilisation and effective investment with respect to the leverage of firms are both 
negative. This is ensured by assuming that 2 , bs  and 1b  are sufficiently large and fs  
and 2b  are sufficiently small (and, hence, 2  is small) so as for the negative effects of 
the firm leverage on aggregate demand to outweigh the positive ones; this implies that 
(32) and (37) are postulated to be negative. 
 
Table 3 shows that an increase in the deposits-to-capital ratio on economic activity has 
both favourable and unfavourable effects on economic activity. Therefore, the sign of 
Eqs. (33) and (38) is ambiguous. On the one hand, a rise in d  tends to boost 
consumption via the wealth effect and the induced increase in the interest income of 
households. On the other hand, a higher d  increases, ceteris paribus, the leverage of 
banks and hence credit rationing (throughout the paper we adopt the plausible 
assumption that 1h  and 2h  are sufficiently small so as for 0dlb ; see Eq. (43)). 
Moreover, there is an ambiguous impact on consumption from the distributed profits 
of banks: a higher d  increases the interest paid by banks on deposits but it also 
increases the interest received on treasury bills (recall that treasury bills are a 
proportion of deposits).  
 
Eqs. (34) and (39) show that an increase in the advances-to-capital ratio produces 
unambiguously a decrease in capacity utilisation and effective investment rate: a rise 
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in advances-to-capital ratio leads, other things equal, to more liabilities and to a higher 
bank leverage (see Eq. (42)), enhancing thereby credit rationing; it also reduces the 
distributed profits of banks with negative effects on consumption. Eqs. (35) and (40) 
show that a higher target leverage ratio of firms increases the rate of capacity 
utilisation and the effective investment rate; the same holds for the target leverage 
ratio of banks which is a linear function of Tlf  (see Eq. (28)). Lastly, Eqs. (36) and 
(41) show that, when government expenditures-to-capital ratio increases, *u  and *g  
become higher. 
 
For the purposes of our analysis, attention is confined to the system of the five 
dynamic equations for the leverage of firms  fl , the deposits-to-capital ratio  d , the 
advances-to-capital ratio  a , the target leverage of firms  Tfl , and the government 
expenditures-to-capital ratio  vog  .20 It is assumed that in the dynamic evolution of 
the system the equilibrium values of u  and g  are always attained. We have that: 
 
       lbblfgbisuvsslfbb
K
L
fl lfwf
T
2
*
12
*
12200 1 







  (45) 
            aclfcdgccvussc
K
D
d wf 3121
*
211
*
1 111111 







  (46) 
        agisdghhlfgisdhhfl
K
A
a ablb
**
214
*
21 11 







  (47) 
   TTnT lflfggfl  021   (48) 
           govgovelblblblbelflflflfevog rToTToT  30201  (49) 
                                                 
20
 Note that this 5D system is independent of the treasury bills held by the commercial banks, the central 
bank and the government. The treasury bills are determined as a residual, without having feedback 
effects on the 5D system (see Eqs. (20), (22) and (24)). 
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TT lflb   (50) 
 
The steady-state values of the variables are estimated by setting the above differential 
equations equal to zero.
21
 The unique steady state of the system denoted by a subscript 
0 is the following: 
 
ngg 0 , rgovgov 0 , 
 
nlf
nwf
gis
gvuss
lf



0
0
1
, 
 
  00210
0210
00
1 adhhlf
dhhlf
lblb T


 , 
  
  112
0201
0
1
1


ccg
lfc
d
n 

 , 
    
nab
nlb
gis
dhhlfgis
a


 021400
1
, 
 
0
0310210211
0



aclfcdccgovg
u rn  and  
  


22
20120100
0
b
lbblfbubg
lf TnT


  
 
where  dab ihis  24 ,   wf ssvcv  1110 ,       00 11  rnwf govgvss ,  
          021430211 111  nabnwf gisghhvvcssv  and 
       03022  nabnlb gisgisvv . 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 In the mathematical analysis and the simulation exercises presented in section 4 it is assumed that 
  020120100 lbblfbubgn   , nab gis  ,      01 02140  dhhlfgis nlb , nlf gis   and 
  nwf gvuss  01 . These conditions ensure that the values of the variables at the steady state are always 
positive. 
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4. Instability, cycles and the stabilising role of fiscal policy 
 
4.1 The macro system with exogenous desired margins of safety and government 
expenditures 
 
We initially focus on the 3D subsystem given by the laws of motion for lf , d  and a ; 
Tlf  and gov  are kept at their steady-state values. The interactions between the 
endogenous variables in this subsystem are quite complex. As described in section 3, 
lf , d  and a  affect the investment rate and the capacity utilisation rate. 
Simultaneously, any change in investment and capacity utilisation influences lf , d  
and a  through various channels. This implies that the three endogenous variables are 
all interconnected in a complex way.  
 
It is worth mentioning briefly the channels through which investment and capacity 
utilisation influence lf , d  and a . A common effect of investment on the loans-to-
capital ratio, the deposits-to-capital ratio and the advances-to-capital ratio is the impact 
on the denominator of these ratios though the resulting changes in capital stock. 
Remarkably, the higher these ratios the more important the impact of capital stock 
variations.  
 
Regarding the law of motion of lf , an increase in capacity utilisation exerts 
counteracting effects on new loans (and therefore on the numerator of the leverage 
ratio). On the one hand, there is a tendency of new loans to increase since desired 
investment is positively affected by a higher capacity utilisation rate. On the other 
hand, new loans tend to decline because higher economic activity increases the sales 
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of firms and, thus, their undistributed profits. The deposits-to-capital ratio is positively 
influenced by a rise in capacity utilisation and investment: higher economic activity 
tends to increase the income of households and, therefore, their saving and deposits. 
The advances-to-capital ratio is not directly affected by economic activity; however, 
the balance sheet of banks implies that there are indirect effects through the change in 
loans and deposits.  
 
The stability properties of the 3D subsystem are summarised in Proposition 1.  
 
Proposition 1. Consider the 3D subsystem of Eqs. (45)-(47). Suppose that economic 
activity is debt-burdened (i.e. 2 , bs  and 1b  are sufficiently large and fs , 2b  and 2  
are sufficiently small). If 0lf , 0d , 0a , 1  and 3  are sufficiently small, the steady state 
of the 3D subsystem is locally stable (see Appendix A for the proof).  
 
The economic rationale behind Proposition 1 can be explained as follows. Sufficiently 
low values of fs  and 0lf  ensure that any increase (decrease) in investment and 
capacity utilisation translates into a higher (lower) lf : the new loans created by the 
inducement of firms to invest more (less) outweigh the increase (decline) in 
undistributed profits and the increase (decrease) in capital stock. Therefore, the 
existence of a debt-burdened regime in conjunction with a low 0lf  ensures a stabilising 
relationship between the investment rate and the leverage of firms: a rise in lf  reduces 
investment, lower investment decreases lf  and the decline in lf  brings the investment 
rate back to its steady-state value (and vice versa). Moreover, sufficiently low values 
of 0d  and 0a , 1  and 3  ensure that there is a similar stabilising relationship between 
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economic activity, the deposits-to-capital ratio and the advances-to-capital ratio. 
Recall that 1  and 3  are related with the impact of d  and a  on capacity utilisation: 
the lower they are the lower this impact. Hence, if the conditions described in 
Proposition 1 are satisfied, the system becomes overall stable. 
 
4.2 Making the desired margins of safety endogenous 
 
We now turn to analyse the stability properties of the subsystem in which the target 
leverage ratios change endogenously. This is the 4D subsystem consisting of Eqs. 
(45)-(48); gov  is kept at its steady-state value. Its stability properties are described in 
Proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2. Consider the 4D subsystem of Eqs. (45)-(48). Suppose that the 
conditions described in Proposition 1 hold (i.e. the 3D subsystem is stable). Suppose 
also that the Conditions (51)-(54) hold.  
 
1
2
)3(
1



a
g Tlf
 (51) 
)3(
1a
g Tlf

  (52) 
 
)3(
2
321
a
g Tlf

  (53) 
)3(
3a
g Tlf

  (54) 
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Then, the steady state of the 4D subsystem is locally stable, unstable or exhibits a limit 
cycle depending on the value of 1  (the sensitivity of target leverage ratios to the 
investment cycle). In particular, it holds that:  
(I) The system is locally stable for sufficiently small values of 1 . 
(II) The system is locally unstable for sufficiently high values of 1 . 
(III) There is a parameter value b1  at which a simple Hopf bifurcation occurs and the 
subsystem exhibits a limit cycle. 
(See Appendix B for the proof). 
 
The endogenous change in the target leverage ratios can generate destabilising forces 
in an otherwise stable system in which economic activity is debt-burdened. The reason 
is briefly the following: As the effective investment rate increases (decreases) relative 
to the normal rate, the target leverage ratios become higher (lower) (see Eqs. (48) and 
(50)). Consequently, the negative stabilising effect of the leverage of firms and banks 
on desired investment and credit availability becomes less (more) strong due to the 
higher (lower) euphoria of firms and banks and the decline (increase) in perceived 
risk.  
 
Proposition 2 suggests that the stability of the 4D subsystem is guaranteed only if the 
sensitivity of the target leverage ratios to the investment cycle is below a critical value, 
as well as if the partial derivative of effective investment with respect to the firms’ 
target leverage ratio is not high enough (see Conditions (51)-(54)). These conditions 
ensure that the destabilising forces of increasing euphoria and lower perceived risk are 
not sufficiently large. If these conditions are not met instability emerges.  
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In order to analyse in greater detail the destabilising effects of endogenous alterations 
in the target leverage ratio we have conducted some simulations using the parameter 
values reported in Appendix C.
22
 In the simulation analysis 1  has been used as the 
critical parameter for the stability properties of the subsystem.
23
 Moreover, the 
underlying 3D subsystem described in section 4.1 is always stable.  
 
Fig. 1 shows the effects of an increasing 1  on the stability of the subsystem, in the 
aftermath of an exogenous rise in the target leverage ratios. It can be readily seen that, 
as the sensitivity of the target leverage ratios to the investment cycle rises, the 
subsystem gradually turns from stability to instability.
24
  
 
<Insert Fig. 1 here> 
 
In order to understand the underlying mechanisms, it is useful first to outline the case 
in which 01  . In this case an exogenous rise in the target leverage ratios leads to 
higher desired investment and greater credit availability. The resulting higher effective 
investment increases firm and bank leverage (in our simulations it also leads to a 
higher level of deposits and advances relative to capital stock). Since economic 
activity is debt-burdened, the increasing firm leverage generates lower investment 
which, in turn, brings loans, deposits and advances to their steady-state values.  
 
On the other hand, when the target leverage ratios are endogenous, an exogenous 
increase in these targets does not only increase effective investment and new loans, but 
                                                 
22
 The Matlab codes for the simulation exercises are available upon request. 
23
 The simulation exercises presented in Fig. 1 as well as in Fig. 4 have been inspired by Chiarella et al. 
(2012).  
24
 The system turns from stability to instability at 659.01  .  
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also positively affects, via higher accumulation, the euphoria of firms and banks. This 
euphoria combined with the lower perceived risk tends to further increase loan 
accumulation. If 1  is high enough, this new second-round effect is likely to produce 
an excessive increase in the leverage of firms and banks, giving rise to a destabilising 
mechanism. The inverse mechanisms are at work when the effective investment rate 
falls short of the normal one. Overall, the higher the value of 1  the stronger the 
destabilising forces, as Fig. 1 illustrates. 
 
Proposition 2 suggests that there is a critical value for 1  at which the destabilising 
forces exactly offset the stabilising ones, producing a limit cycle. Fig. 2 illustrates the 
trajectories of the main variables of the 4D subsystem in our simulations when a limit 
cycle emerges. Fig. 3 shows the relationship between the leverage ratio of firms and 
the effective investment rate under the case of a limit cycle.  
 
<Insert Fig. 2 here> 
 
<Insert Fig. 3 here> 
 
The cyclical behaviour of the economy can be described as follows. Initially, the 
effective investment rate is driven up, following the exogenous increase in the target 
leverage ratios; the economy is located at point A in Fig. 3. Since the effective 
investment rate becomes higher than the normal one (the latter is equal to 0.04 in our 
simulations), a second-round endogenous increase in the target leverage ratio occurs. 
The firm leverage increases as a result of the higher capital accumulation and the 
Page 31 of 54
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
30 
 
greater willingness of both firms and banks to undertake more risky projects. The rise 
in the firm leverage produces in our simulations an increase in bank leverage. 
 
The higher leverage of both firms and banks has negative feedback effects on the 
effective investment rate. Eventually, this rate falls short of the normal one (point B in 
Fig. 3), generating a fall in the target leverage ratio of firms and banks. As a 
consequence, the leverage of firms and banks start falling. When these variables reach 
a sufficiently low value (point C in Fig. 3), the effective investment rate starts 
increasing. Yet, the economy continues to experience a fall in lf  and lb  for some 
periods: the pessimism of economic agents keeps rising and the effective investment 
rate is still low to cause a sufficient increase in new loans. When the effective 
investment rate passes the ng  threshold (point D in Fig. 3), the euphoric expectations 
begin to dominate again, producing a rise in the leverage ratio of firms and banks. 
Simultaneously, the effective investment rate continues to increase until the leverage 
ratios of firms and banks become high enough to cause a fall in the effective 
investment rate. When this happens, a new cycle begins.  
 
Interestingly enough, during the cycles investment and leverage move both in the 
same and in the opposite direction. In particular, during the investment boom periods, 
in which the investment rate is high and growing, the leverage ratios also increase; in 
the investment bust periods the leverage ratios decline. This movement of leverage 
and investment towards the same direction is caused by the endogenous change in the 
desired margins of safety that weakens the debt-burdened effect. However, there are 
also phases in which the effective investment rate moves inversely with the leverage 
ratios of firms and banks. In particular, when the effective investment rate starts rising 
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(declining), the leverage ratios continue to fall (increase) until the effective investment 
rate becomes high (low) enough to trigger a rise (decline) in the target leverage ratios. 
It becomes thereby clear that the relationship between leverage and effective 
investment rate crucially relies on the way that the desired margins of safety change 
during the investment cycle. 
 
4.3 The role of fiscal policy 
 
We now turn to investigate whether fiscal policy can reduce the destabilsing forces 
generated by the endogenous changes in the desired margins of safety. The 
government expenditures-to-capital ratio is allowed to change endogenously according 
to the fiscal rule described in Eq. (49). We examine whether, for identical parameter 
values as in Fig. 1 and for the same range of values for 1 , the 5D system is 
characterised by higher stability. Fig. 4 indicates that this is indeed the case: the rise in 
the sensitivity of target leverage ratios to the investment cycle does not increase the 
fluctuation of the macroeconomic variables, as it is the case in Fig. 1.  
 
<Insert Fig. 4 here> 
 
The economic interpretation is the following. In the 4D subsystem in which gov  is 
exogenous the rise in the target leverage ratio of firms and banks leads to an economic 
expansion that produces second-round destabilising forces in the system due to the 
positive impact of investment on target leverage ratios. In the 5D system the fiscal rule 
mitigates these second-round forces. By generating a reduction in gov  as a response to 
the rise in the target leverage ratios, the induced increase in the investment rate is less 
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strong and, hence, the increase in the target leverage ratios is less significant. 
Moreover, in the periods in which the expectations deteriorate and the target leverage 
ratios decline relative to the actual ones the fiscal rule causes a rise in gov  preventing 
a significant reduction in economic activity. Consequently, the fiscal rule put forward 
in this paper dampens the large oscillations in the macroeconomic variables, which are 
fuelled by the rise in 1 , rendering the macro system more stable. 
  
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper presented a stock-flow consistent macrodynamic model in which firms’ 
and banks’ desired margins of safety play a central role in the behaviour of the 
macroeconomy. The model incorporates an active commercial banking sector, 
allowing us to pay particular attention to the evolution of the leverage of both firms 
and banks during the investment cycle. Dynamic analysis illustrated that a higher 
sensitivity of firms’ and banks’ desired margins of safety to the investment cycle 
makes the macro system more prone to instability. Therefore, the euphoria and low 
perceived risk of both firms and banks during an investment boom and the excessively 
high desired margins of safety during an investment bust can be important sources of 
instability. Moreover, simulation analysis showed that leverage and investment can 
move both in the same and in the opposite direction during the cycles without being 
necessary to turn from a debt-burdened regime to a debt-led one.   
 
The paper also analysed the stabilising role of fiscal policy in an economy in which 
desired margins of safety change endogenously. The paper put forward a fiscal rule 
that produces a rise (decline) in government expenditures when firms and banks have 
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excessively high (low) desired margins of safety. Simulation analysis indicated that 
this rule has stabilising effects. Therefore, a fiscal policy that responds adequately to 
the endogenous changes in the desired margins of safety appears to be essential for the 
stability of the macroeconomic system.   
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1 
 
The Jacobian matrix of the 3D subsystem  DJ 3  consisting of Eqs. (45)-(47) evaluated 
at the steady state is written as: 
 











333231
232221
131211
3
JJJ
JJJ
JJJ
J D  
 
where 
 









0
01111 1
X
lfbHlflfJ  
  dd lbblfuXdlfJ 20012 1

 
  aa lbblfuXalfJ 20013 1

 










0
0
1221 d
Z
bHlfdJ  
  02211022 1 dlbbgccuZddJ dnd 

 
  aa lbbdcuZadJ 2031023 1 

 











0
105
1331 1 a
a
bHlfaJ
  
        2112140210532 111 cchhalbbuadaJ dd 

  
       31210210533 111 

chhgisalbbuaaaJ nabaa  
 
We have that    vsslfX wf  11 010  ,      1010 111 dvsscZ wf  , 
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       vsschhvss wfwf  11111 12115  , 
 









 21000221 1
cXX
lflbbgisH lfnlf  ,  
    2102100222 1 









 c
Z
cd
Z
lbbH lf  and 
     211050105222121 1113 










 c
a
a
a
lbbchhisisH lflblf

 . 
 
The Routh-Hurwitz necessary and sufficient conditions for the stability of the 3D 
subsystem require that the coefficients )3()3(
3
)3(
2
)3(
1 ,,, baaa  be all positive in the steady 
state (see Gandolfo, 2010). These coefficients are as follows: 
 
  1
0
013
)3(
1 1 b
X
lfJTra D 






  (A.1) 
 
132
3332
2322
3331
1311
2221
1211)3(
2 b
JJ
JJ
JJ
JJ
JJ
JJ
a   (A.2) 
 
  1543
)3(
3 bJDeta D   (A.3) 
 
42115
0
0231
2
1
0
03
)3(
3
)3(
2
)3(
1
)3( 11 



















 b
X
lfb
X
lfaaab  (A.4) 
 
where 
332211 JJH  ,   23321223322133332212 JJJHJJJHJJH  , 
  130
105
120
0
3322
0
03 11 Ja
a
Jd
Z
JJ
X
lf 
























 , 
     2312221333213331222332332214 JJJJHJJJJHJJJJH   and 
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     231222130
015
321333120
0
23323322
0
05 11 JJJJa
a
JJJJd
Z
JJJJ
X
lf 
























 . 
 
We have 0)3(1 a  since 0,, 332211 JJJ . In particular, 011 J  due to the assumptions 
that 0lf , 2b , fs , and 2  are sufficiently small; 022 J  because of the assumptions that 
0dlb  and that 0d , 1 , 2b  are sufficiently small; 033 J  due to the assumptions that 
nab gis   (see footnote 21) and that 0a , 3  are sufficiently small. 
 
It holds that 0)3(2 a  since 0, 32  . We have 02   because the terms 
 33221 JJH  , 3322JJ  are positive and adequately large. In particular,  33221 JJH   is 
positive because 0, 3322 JJ  (see above) and 01 H  due to a sufficiently small 0lf ; 
3322JJ  is positive because 0, 3322 JJ  (see above). The terms  33221 JJH  , 3322JJ  
are sufficiently large because of the assumption that 
0a  is low enough. Moreover, 
03   since the term  3322
0
01 JJ
X
lf 






  is positive and adequately large. 
This term is positive because 0, 3322 JJ  (see above) and 0lf  is sufficiently small. 
Additionally, the term  3322
0
01 JJ
X
lf 






  is adequately large due to a 
sufficiently small 
0a . 
 
We have 0)3(3 a  because 0, 54  . In particular, 04   because the term 33221 JJH  
is positive and adequately large; it is positive since 0,, 13322 HJJ  (see above) and it 
is adequately large due to a sufficiently small 
0a . Moreover, 05   because the term 
3322
0
01 JJ
X
lf 






  is positive and adequately large; it is positive since 0, 3322 JJ  (see 
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above) and due to a sufficiently small 
0lf ; it is adequately large due to a sufficiently 
small 
0a . 
 
Finally, 0)3( b  because a sufficiently small 
0d  and a sufficiently small 0lf  ensure that 
0421   and 01 5
0
0231 







X
lf .  
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Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 2 
 
The Jacobian matrix of the 4D subsystem  DJ 4  consisting of Eqs. (45)-(48) evaluated 
at the steady state is written as: 
 















44434241
34333231
24232221
14131211
4
JJJJ
JJJJ
JJJJ
JJJJ
J D  
 
where 
 
  






 002214 1
X
lfblfflJ T   
  







 0
0
2224 d
Z
blfdJ T   
  







 10502234 1


a
ablfaJ T  
lf
T glfflJ 141 
  
d
T gdflJ 142 
  
0143  a
T gaflJ   
2144   Tlf
TT glfflJ   
 
The rest entries of the Jacobian matrix are reported in Appendix A.  
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The conditions of Proposition 1 suggest that 0,, 342414 JJJ  and 041 J . In particular, 
a sufficient low value of 
0lf  implies that 014 J ; a sufficient low value of 0d  suggests 
that 024 J ; a sufficient low value of 0a  implies that 034 J ; the existence of debt-
burdened regime suggests that 041 J .  
 
The Routh-Hurwitz necessary and sufficient conditions for the stability of the 4D 
subsystem require that the coefficients )4()4(
4
)4(
3
)4(
2
)4(
1 ,,,, baaaa  be all positive in the 
steady state (see Gandolfo, 2010). These coefficients are written as follows: 
 
TlfD
gaJTra 12
)3(
14
)4(
1 )(    (B.1) 
 

4443
3433
4442
2422
4441
1411
3332
2322
3331
1311
2221
1211)4(
2
JJ
JJ
JJ
JJ
JJ
JJ
JJ
JJ
JJ
JJ
JJ
JJ
a  
          Tlfgaaa )3(11)3(12)3(2   (B.2) 
 

444241
242221
141211
444341
343331
141311
444342
343332
242322
333231
232221
131211
)4(
3
JJJ
JJJ
JJJ
JJJ
JJJ
JJJ
JJJ
JJJ
JJJ
JJJ
JJJ
JJJ
a  
         321)3(21)3(22)3(3  agaa Tlf  (B.3) 
 
  TlfD gaaJDeta )3(31)3(324)4(4 )(   (B.4) 
 
    31321210
2)4(
3
)4(
4
2)4(
1
)4(
3
)4(
2
)4(
1
)4(   aaaaaab  (B.5) 
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where 
dalf gJgJgJ 243414  ,  33143413221424121 JJJJJJJJg lf  , 
 33243423211411242 JJJJJJJJgd  ,  32243422311434113 JJJJJJJJga  , 
      312232211431243421123224342211 JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJga   
              312333211431243421133224342311 JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJgd   
              322333221432243422133324342312 JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJg lf  , 
    0)3(222)3(1)3()3(22)3(30  babaa   and 
      0)3(32)3(13213  TTTTT lflflflflf gaggagg . 
 
Note that 1  and 2  are independent of 1 .  
 
Proof of 2 (I). Differentiating Eqs. (B.1)-(B.4) with respect to 
1 , yields: 
 
01
)4(
1  Tlfga   (B.6) 
  Tlfgaa )3(11)4(2   (B.7) 
 321)3(21)4(3  aga Tlf  (B.8) 
  Tlfgaa )3(31)4(4   (B.9) 
 
Eq. (B.6) implies that )4(
1a  is a decreasing function of 1 ; recall that 0Tlfg  (see Eq. 
(40)). The coefficient )4(
1a  becomes equal to zero for   Tlf
a
ga 2
)3(
111
1   ; note 
that 011 
a  because 0)3(1 a  (see Appendix A). Therefore, 0
)4(
1 a  if 
1
11
a   and 
0)4(1 a  if 
1
11
a  . Moreover, since 0, )3(3
)3(
2 aa  (see Appendix A) and 02  , the 
coefficients )4(3
)4(
2 ,aa  and 
)4(
4a  are all positive under the Conditions (52), (53) and (54).  
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By setting Eq. (B.5) equal to zero we obtain:  
 
0011
2
12
3
13
)4(  b  (B.10) 
 
At 01   we have 00
)4( b . At 111
a  , we have   02)4(3)4(  ab . Therefore, 
due to continuity, we obtain that for sufficiently positive low values of 1   all of the 
Routh-Hurwitz conditions are satisfied (i.e. 0,,,, )4()4(4
)4(
3
)4(
2
)4(
1 baaaa ) and the 
system is thereby stable.   
 
Proof of 2 (II). For sufficiently high values of 
1  we have 0
)4( b  and, therefore, one 
of the Routh-Hurwitz conditions is violated. This implies that the system is unstable.  
 
Proof of 2 (III).  At 01   we have 0
)4( b  and at 111
a   we have 0)4( b . Hence, 
the cubic equation 0)( 1
)4( b  has at least one solution, b1 , such that 
1
110
ab    
with the property that 0)4( b  for all 
1  near but not equal to 
b
1 . Furthermore, at 
b
11    we have 0,,,
)4(
4
)4(
3
)4(
2
)4(
1 aaaa . According to Asada and Yoshida (2003), 
these properties are sufficient for the existence of a simple Hopf bifurcation at 
b
11   .  
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Appendix C. Parameter values in simulations 
 
δ 0 0.02 b 2 0.01 h 2 0.75
δ 1 0.1 c 1 0.7 ξ 2 0.5
δ 2 0.5 c 2 0.1 e 1 0.8
s f 0.6 h l 4 e 2 0.05
sw 0.6 h d 0.5 e 3 20
v 0.25 i b 0.02 φ 15
b 0 0.01 s b 0.3 gov r 0.005
b 1 0.5 h 1 0.05 g n 0.04  
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Table 1 
Balance sheet matrix. 
Deposits +D -D 0
Loans -L +L 0
Treasury bills +B b -B +B cb 0
High-powered money +HPM -HPM 0
Advances -A +A 0
Capital +K +K
Total (net worth) +D +V f +K b -B 0 +K
Central bankHouseholds GovernmentCommercial 
banks
Firms Total
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Table 2 
Transactions matrix. 
Households Government Central bank Total
Current Capital Current Capital
Investment +I -I 0
Consumption -C +C 0
Government expenditures +GOV -GOV 0
Wage bill +W -W 0
Interest on loans -i l L +i l L 0
Interest on treasury bills +i bB b -i bB +i bB cb 0
Interest on deposits +i dD -i dD 0
Interest on advances -i aA +i aA 0
Commercial banks' profits +PB d -PB +PB u 0
Central bank's profits +PCB -PCB 0
Firms' profits +PF d -PF +PF u 0
Change in deposits 0
Change in loans 0
Change in treasury bills 0
Change in advances 0
Change in high-powered money 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Firms Commercial banks
AA
MPH  MPH 
D D
L L
B
bB
 cbB

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Table 3 
Effects of firms’ leverage ratio and deposits-to-capital ratio on economic activity. 
Effect Parameter(s) that 
capture the effect
Direct negative effect on desired investment δ 2
Direct negative effect on credit availability b 1
Indirect negative effect on consumption via the distributed profits of firms c 1 (1-s f )i l
Indirect positive effect on consumption via the distributed  profits of banks c 1 (1-s b )i l
Indirect positive effect on credit availability via the leverage of banks b 2
Indirect positive or negative effect on consumption via the distributed profits of banks c 1 (1-s b )(i a h 2 -i d )
Direct positive effect on consumption via wealth c 2
Direct positive effect on consumption via interest payments c 1 i d
Indirect negative effect on credit availability via the leverage of banks b 2
Effects of firms' leverage ratio on economic activity
Effects of deposits-to-capital ratio on economic activity
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Fig. 1. Dynamic adjustments of the 4D subsystem to a 1% increase in the target leverage ratios for 
varying values of target leverage ratios’ sensitivity to the investment cycle  1 . 
 
(a) Firms’ leverage ratio  lf  
 
 
(c) Firms’ target leverage ratio  Tlf  
 
 
 
(e) Deposits-to-capital ratio  d  
 
 
(g) Effective investment rate  g  
 
 
 
(b) Banks’ leverage ratio  lb  
 
 
(d) Banks’ target leverage ratio  Tlb  
 
 
(f) Advances-to-capital ratio  a  
 
 
(h) Capacity utilisation rate  u  
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Fig. 2. Dynamic trajectories under the case of a limit cycle in the 4D subsystem. 
 
 
(a) Firms’ leverage ratio  lf  
 
 
(c) Firms’ target leverage ratio  Tlf  
 
 
(e) Deposits-to-capital ratio  d  
 
 
(g) Effective investment rate  g  
 
 
(b) Banks’ leverage ratio  lb  
 
 
(d) Banks’ target leverage ratio  Tlb  
 
 
(f) Advances-to-capital ratio  a  
 
 
(h) Capacity utilisation rate  u  
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Fig. 3. Relationship between firms’ leverage ratio and effective investment rate under the case of a limit 
cycle in the 4D subsystem. 
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Fig. 4. Dynamic adjustments of the 5D system to a 1% increase in the target leverage ratios for varying 
values of target leverage ratios’ sensitivity to the investment cycle  1 . 
 
 
(a) Firms’ leverage ratio  lf  
 
 
(c) Firms’ target leverage ratio  Tlf  
 
 
(e) Deposits-to-capital ratio  d  
 
 
(g) Effective investment rate  g  
 
 
 
(b) Banks’ leverage ratio  lb  
 
 
(d) Banks’ target leverage ratio  Tlb  
 
 
(f) Advances-to-capital ratio  a  
 
 
(h) Government expenditures-to-capital ratio  gov  
 
 
 
